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Belief revision, belief merging and voting
Dov Gabbay and Gabriella Pigozzi and Odinaldo Rodrigues1
Abstract. In belief revision, an agent is faced with the problem
of choosing between several alternatives when trying to restore con-
sistency to theory. Ideally, the choice process is conducted in a way
that verifies a number of fairness principles. On the other hand, be-
lief merging concerns with the problem of determining a group’s be-
liefs from individual members’ beliefs that are not always compatible
with each other. Similarly, in voting systems, a social welfare func-
tion takes individual preferences into account in order to produce a
collective preference. Here again certain fairness principles are desir-
able. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between revision,
merging and voting.
1 Introduction
This paper makes a connection between voting, belief revision and
merging by applying general the principles/ideas to a particular prob-
lem and seeing how the principles interact. We recognize the follow-
ing three scenarios:
1. Voting. There are several conflicting demands/preferences and we
are looking for a collective compromise.
2. Belief revision. We are facing an inconsistent or unacceptable log-
ical theory, and we are looking for a way out.
3. Belief merging. We are trying to aggregate knowledge bases which
together are possibly inconsistent.
Our best bet in bringing the above three areas together is to look at
a problem which can be equally considered by each one of them and
compare how they would deal with it. In this way we can learn from
each point of view and export ideas to the other two.
Our strategy for investigation can be outlined as follows.
Step 1. Start with an example of theory revision of a theory T by
an input formula τ .
Step 2. See this as a voting problem, i.e., consider τ as the formula
expressing the voting rules, and the voters as a classical logic theory
T . If the voters’ preferences are incompatible, the revision of T by
τ will seek a compromise consistent with the voting rules. This, in
the case of a maxichoice revision function, will be obtained from
a maximal subset of T consistent with τ . We compare the a priori
philosophical demands of revision theory and voting and find that
while revision theory may pick a dictator voting does not want one.
Step 3. Now that we have a connection between voters and the vot-
ing rules (by seeing them as logical structures) we can apply the same
reasoning for the case of belief merging. In this case, we see voters
as individual belief bases and the voting rules as integrity constraints.
We also find that this approach is not entirely satisfactory.
Step 4. We continue by analysing how the way of thinking in one
view can enrich the way of thinking in the other views.
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Essentially this problem involves reasoning about orders and there
are two natural moves one can make with logic theories involving or-
ders. One has to do with the way we interpret the order itself whereas
the other has to do with the kind of logic we use to represent and ma-
nipulate it. We note that
a. Logical theories need not be complete or associated with any
particular strict linear order.
b. Theories can be made numerically valued of fuzzy values (i.e.,
values need not be restricted to just true or false, but can be taken
from a range of points in-between).
From the voting point of view, (a.) means the voters may be un-
certain about how all outcomes compare with each other, but may be
clear about how some of them do, i.e., a voter may not have a particu-
lar preference between outcomes x and y, but may prefer z to either.
In addition, voters may give conditional preferences (for example: if
a voter prefers a to b, then he/she might also expect to prefer c to d).
As for (b.), numerical values do appear in range voting in a natu-
ral way. In this paper, we will concentrate on (a.) leaving (b.) to be
explored in future work.
A number of authors have investigated ways of combining prefer-
ence relations [2, 17]. The difference in our approach is that we bring
the mechanism for representing preferences to the object level itself
and hence can analyse it from a entirely logical perspective.
2 Background Review
Since our approach combines principles from voting theory, belief
revision and belief merging, we start by introducing some concepts
that will be used in the remaining of this paper.
2.1 Voting
Voting is concerned with the aggregation of individual preferences
in order to select a collectively preferred alternative. This problem is
extensively studied by social choice theory [3, 4, 18]. Probably the
most famous method for the aggregation of preferences is the one
proposed in the 18th century by the Marquis de Condorcet. Given a
set of individual preferences, we compare each of the alternatives in
pairs. For each pair, we determine the winner by majority voting, and
the final collective ordering is obtained by a combination of all partial
results. Unfortunately, this method led to the first aggregation prob-
lem, known as the Condorcet paradox: the pairwise majority rule can
lead to cycles in the collective ordering. In other words, this ordering
cannot be used to select an overall preferred candidate.
Preferences over some set X of alternatives can be formalised as
follows. Let < be a binary relation on X ×X, where x < y denotes
that alternative x is preferred to y. The desired properties of pref-
erences corresponding to strict linear orders are given below, where
{x, y, z} range over elements of X.
(P1) ∀x, y, z((x < y ∧ y < z) → x < z) (transitivity)
(P2) ∀x, y(x = y → (x < y ∨ y < x)) (totality)
(P3) ∀x, y((x < y)→ ¬(y < x)) (asymmetry)
With the above formalisation, the Condorcet paradox can be ex-
pressed as follows. Suppose that there are three possible candidates
a, b and c (that is, {a, b, c} ∈ X) and three voters, who express their
total preferences in the following way:
V1 = {a < b, b < c}
V2 = {b < c, c < a}
V3 = {c < a, a < b}
According to Condorcet’s method, a < b has the majority of the
voters (V1 and V3), so does b < c (V1 and V2) and, so does, c < a (V2
and V3). This leads us to the collective outcome a < b, b < c and c <
a, which together with transitivity (P1) violates (P3) (asymmetry).
Unfortunately, this is not a particular problem of Condorcet’s
method. More recently, the aggregation of preferences was investi-
gated by K. Arrow, who proved an important result which became
known as “Arrow’s impossibility theorem”, stated below.
Let X be a non-empty set of mutually exclusive social states and
≤i be a total, reflexive and transitive preference relation for an indi-
vidual i over the states in X (and <i its strict counterpart).
Suppose there are n individuals in society. A social welfare func-
tion (SWF) is a function that produces a total, reflexive and transi-
tive social preference relation  from a given n-tuple of individual
orderings {≤1, . . . ,≤n} (again we use ≺ to denote ’s strict coun-
terpart).
Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that whenever |X| > 2, the
following conditions become incompatible:
(Universal domain) The social preference function should be able
to cover all admissible individual preference relations.
(Independence of irrelevant alternatives - IIA) The social prefer-
ence on any pair of alternatives depends exclusively on the individual
preferences over that pair.
(Non-dictatorship) There is no individual i such that for each
{x, y} ∈ X, x <i y implies x ≺ y.
(Weak Pareto principle) if for all i, x <i y, then x ≺ y
The above condition is also called unanimity.
2.2 Belief revision
The main object of study of theory of belief revision is the dynamics
of the process of belief change: when an agent is faced with new in-
formation which contradicts his/her current beliefs, he/she will have
to retract some of the old beliefs in order to accommodate the new
belief consistently. This can generally be done in several ways. Ratio-
nality postulates were initially proposed by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson and became known as the AGM postulates for belief
revision, presented below. There is extensive literature on the subject,
including [1, 9, 10].
Let K be a set of sentences closed under logical consequence (a
belief set) and A and B well formed formulae (beliefs). The revi-
sion of K by A is denoted by K◦A and should satisfy the following
requirements:
(K◦1) K◦A is a belief set
(K◦2) A ∈ K◦A
(K◦3) K◦A ⊆ Cn(K ∪ {A})
(K◦4) If ¬A ∈ K, then Cn(K ∪ {A}) ⊆ K◦A
(K◦5) K◦A = K⊥ only if A is contradictory
(K◦6) If A ≡ B, then K◦A ≡ K◦B
(K◦7) K◦(A ∧B) ⊆ Cn((K◦A) ∪ {B})
(K◦8) If ¬B ∈ K◦A, then Cn(K◦A ∪ {B}) ⊆ K◦(A ∧ B)
These postulates are well known. In [8], we have argued that the
postulates can be somewhat simplified. In particular, (K◦3)–(K◦5)
have something to say only when K ∪ {A} is consistent, or when
it is inconsistent even though A is non-contradictory. The particu-
lar way of writing the postulates given above makes use of technical
properties of classical logic (the way inconsistent theories prove ev-
erything). (K◦3)–(K◦4) effectively mean the following:
(K◦3,4) If A is consistent with K, then K◦A = Cn(K ∪ {A}).
If K is finitely representable, it can be taken as a formula and the
postulate above corresponds to (R2) in Katsuno and Mendelzon’s
rephrasing of the AGM postulates for belief sets represented by finite
bases [11, p. 187].
Similarly, postulates (K◦7)–(K◦8) do not tell us anything new
(beyond what we can deduce from earlier postulates), except in the
case where B is consistent with K◦A, when (K◦7) and (K◦8) to-
gether are equivalent to the postulate below:
(K◦7,8) If B is consistent with K◦A, then Cn((K◦A) ∪ {B}) =
K◦(A ∧B)
which again corresponds to Katsuno and Mendelzon’s (R6).
One of the foundations of the AGM formalism is the idea of in-
formational economy, that states that old beliefs should not be given
up unless strictly necessary in order to consistently accommodate the
new belief. One possibility of defining revision functions is then to
think in terms of the minimal mutilation required to accommodate a
new belief — the contraction of the old belief set — followed be an
expansion of the contracted set by the new belief.2 This is formalised
as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Maximal subsets that fail to imply a sentence)
Let K be a belief set and ¬A a belief. A set K′ is a maximal
subset of K that fails to imply ¬A iff the following conditions are
met:
• K′ ⊆ K
• ¬A ∈ Cn(K′)
• ∀K′′, K′ ⊂ K′′ ⊆ K implies ¬A ∈ Cn(K′′)
In other words, the closure of any subset of K larger than such
a K′ would result in a theory that entails ¬A. It should always be
possible to find such subsets unless ¬A is a tautology, in which case
there is no K′ meeting the above conditions. The set of all subsets
of a belief set K that do not imply a sentence ¬A is usually denoted
K⊥¬A. This set is used to define a number of contraction functions
as explained next. In all cases, a selection function s is used to pick
an appropriate collection of elements of K⊥¬A if it is not empty
or K itself otherwise. The behaviour of s defines three classes of
contraction operations as follows:
• a maxichoice contraction is obtained when s picks one element of
K⊥¬A
• a full meet contraction is obtained when s returns the intersection
of all elements of K⊥¬A
• and finally, a partial meet contraction is obtained when s re-
turns the intersection of some appropriately selected elements of
K⊥¬A
2 This is revision defined in terms of contraction — the well known Levi
identity.
Based on these contraction operations, maxichoice, partial and full
meet revision operations can be defined via the subsequent expansion
of the contracted belief set by the new belief.
2.3 Belief merging
The aggregation of finite sets of information into a collective one is
studied by a recent discipline called belief merging [12, 14, 15]. The
aggregation procedure in belief merging faces problems similar to
those addressed in voting theory. Links between these two disciplines
have been investigated in [12, 16, 5].
A particular type of aggregation is called model-based merging.
Its formal framework consists of a propositional language L, built
up from a finite set P of propositional letters and the usual logical
connectives. Given a finite set of individuals, each person i states
his/her own beliefs as a consistent finite set of propositional formulae
denoted by Ki (his/her belief base).3
An interpretation is a function P → {0, 1} which is extended to
complex formulae in the usual way. Let W = {0, 1}P be the set of
all interpretations and 2W denote the power set of W . For any for-
mula ϕ ∈ L, [ϕ] = {ω ∈ W | ω  ϕ} denotes the set of models of
ϕ, i.e., the set of interpretations w such that w(ϕ) = 1. Conversely,
for any set of models M ⊆ W , let form(M) denote a propositional
formula (up to logical equivalence) such that [form(M)] = M , i.e.,
a formula whose set of models are precisely M . K will be used to
denote the set of all consistent belief bases.
In a model-based framework a merging operator ∆ : Kn → K
is defined by a function m : Kn → 2W from the set of all possible
collections of consistent belief bases (called profiles) to the power set
of W such that for all profiles K ∈ Kn, ∆(K) = form(m(K)).
For reasons of convenience, a merging operator ∆ : Kn → 2W and
its defining function m : Kn → 2W will be used interchangeably
when the context is clear.
Most model-based majoritarian4 merging operators m : Kn →
2W are defined in terms of the minimisation of an appropri-
ate notion of distance. The idea is to select the interpretations
whose distance to a model in the collection of sets of models
{[K1], [K2], ..., [Kn]} is minimal. These models correspond to a
profile K = (K1,K2, ..., Kn) ∈ Kn of belief bases.
A distance between interpretations is a function d : W×W → R+
such that for all ω,ω′ ∈ W:
1. d(ω,ω′) = d(ω′, ω)
2. d(ω,ω′) = 0 iff ω = ω′.
The distance d between an interpretation ω and a belief base
K is the minimal distance d between ω and any model of K,
i.e., d(ω,K) = minω′∈[K] d(ω, ω′). The distance between an
interpretation ω and a profile K is defined with the help of
an aggregation function D : Rn+ → R+ as Dd(ω,K) =
D (d(ω,K1), d(ω,K2), ..., d(ω,Kn)) [13]. Any such aggregation
function induces a total pre-order K on the set W with respect to
the distances to a given profile K . Thus, a majoritarian merging op-
erator m for a profile K can be defined as m(K) = min(W,K),
i.e., the set of all interpretations with minimal distance Dd to the
profile K.
Obviously, the properties of the merging operator essentially de-
pend on the functions d and D. The most widely used merging oper-
ator used in the literature is the operator ∆d,Σ defined as follows:
3 Since each Ki is finite, it is identified with the conjunction of its elements.
4 Intuitively, a majoritarian merging operator aims at satisfying the view of
the majority.
1. d is the Hamming distance — the number of propositional
letters on which two interpretations differ, i.e., d(ω, ω′) =
|{π ∈ P|ω(π) = ω′(π)}| and
2. Dd(ω,K) =
P
id(ω,Ki) is the sum of componentwise distances
d defined in terms of d as given before.
It is also possible to impose some restrictions on the result of the
merging operator. A set of integrity constraints IC is a satisfiable set
of formulae. Given a set of IC, ∆IC(K) restricts the image of the
merging operator ∆ to [IC], i.e., ∆IC(K) gives the models of IC
that differ minimally from models of each Ki ∈ K .
3 Interactions between belief revision, merging and
voting
One way of analysing the interaction between belief revision, merg-
ing and voting is to express voting principles in a logical framework
and then consider what belief revision and belief merging would do
in specific voting scenarios. We start by considering a logic theory of
order and its relation with belief revision.
Consider the language of predicate logic with binary relation <;
the constants a, b, c and the equality symbol =. Assume the axioms
∀x(x = a ∨ x = b ∨ x = c) and a = b = c (this means ¬(a =
b) ∧ ¬(b = c) ∧ ¬(a = c)). Let T be Cn({a < b, b < c, c < a})
and consider an input τ to T saying that < is the strictly linear order
of the three elements a, b, c, i.e., τ = P1 ∧ P2 ∧ P3.
It can be clearly seen that both a < c and c < a follow from
T + τ and this contradicts P3, hence T + τ is not consistent. If we
want to analyse what aspects of T are compatible with a strict linear
order of a, b, c, we can consider the revision of T by τ . This would
replace T + τ with a new consistent theory T ◦ τ containing τ , by
making minimal changes in T . As we saw in Section 2.2, the AGM
postulates constrain how the new theory T ◦ τ is related to τ and to
T . The new theory T ◦ τ is closed under logical consequence, i.e., if
T ◦ τ  A then A ∈ T ◦ τ , but the AGM framework does not give an
algorithm for how to find any such T ◦ τ . One algorithm which can
do the job is given below.
Starting with T⊥¬τ = {T1, T2, T3, ...}, T ◦ τ can be constructed
from any Ti ∈ T⊥¬τ , say Cn(T1 ∪ {τ}) (this would give a maxi-
choice revision of T by τ ). We can find such Ti ∪ {τ} by listing all
sentences which T proves as the list A1, . . . , An, . . . and defining
a sequence S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2, . . . as follows. Let S0 = {τ} and for
n ≥ 0, define define Sn+1 in the following way
Sn+1 =

Sn ∪ {An+1}, if this set is consistent
Sn, otherwise
Finally, let S =
S
i∈N Si.
If we want to look at what we retain from our original T , we see
that S − {τ} ⊆ T is a maximal subtheory of T consistent with τ ,
i.e. S − {τ} = Ti for some i. Which Ti we get depends on the way
we present T as a sequence.
Let us now see what happens if we apply these procedures to our
concrete example. τ says that {a, b, c} is strictly linearly ordered. T
says that a < b and b < c and c < a. T is not consistent with τ . The
maximal subtheories of T consistent with τ include:
T1 = Cn({a < b, b < c})
T2 = Cn({b < c, c < a})
T3 = Cn({a < b, c < a})
When τ is added to these, we get the three options for revision
below:
V1 = Cn({a < b, b < c, τ}
V2 = Cn({b < c, c < a, τ}
V3 = Cn({c < a, a < b, τ}
Note that this logical revision philosophy/approach is entirely
compatible with AGM revision and hence uses three basic assump-
tions:
1. We must replace the inconsistent T + τ by a single consistent
theory T ◦ τ .
2. This replacement contains τ and as much of T as possible. Cer-
tainly we do not want anything not in T to be admitted to T ◦ τ ,
even if consistent with it.
3. We are dealing with two valued logic. In other words, preferences
have to be represented as yes/no statements (as opposed to numer-
ical, probabilistic or fuzzy values).
From the revision point of view, our voting example consists of
three candidate options a, b and c and several voters who express
their total preferences regarding these options. When put together
these preferences result in the theory T . So, for example, we could
have had the following preferences:
Voter 1 — a < b, b < c
Voter 2 — b < c, c < a
Voter 3 — c < a, a < b
Since we need to make a group decision here, we require a com-
promise functional H based on the preferences of Voter 1, Voter 2
and Voter 3, motivated by some general principles, such that:
H(Voter 1, Voter 2, Voter 3) = Some compromise preference,
(i.e., technically some new voter).
We have some reasonable conditions on H , for instance, those
given in the latter part of Section 2.1. One such condition is that
it does not choose as compromise one of the voters — the non-
dictatorship requirement. In practice, this means that we do not want
H to be a projection. Another condition is the principle of indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), i.e., the group decision on how
two distinct elements x and y relate (x < y or y < x) depends
only on how the different voters voted on their relationship. Note
that whereas the principle of non-dictatorship is a purely meta-level
one on the function H and does not make use of the contents of the
theories Ti, (IIA) relates to the properties of the order predicate of
Ti.
Let us now look at our revision example from the voting point
of view. The consistent theories T1, T2, T3 can stand for voters. The
sentence τ is a statement of the layout of the voting system. It spec-
ifies the alternatives {a, b, c} and says that the combination of the
voters preferences is strictly linearly ordered. We immediately ob-
serve that the theory T can be obtained back from the voters as the
result of majority vote.
a < b is voted by V1, V3
b < c is voted by V1, V2
c < a is voted by V2, V3
We now have a voting interpretation of our revision theory situa-
tion. What does maxichoice logical revision do in this situation? It
simply chooses a dictator. This is not always the case. We can con-
struct a consistent theory T from a number of voters V1, V2, . . . that is
incompatible with the voting rules τ , but whose subsequent revision
by τ will not necessarily pick a dictator even if the revision turns out
to be maxichoice. This is illustrated below.
Let V1 = {a < b, b < c, a < c} and V2 = {c < b, b < a, c < a}
and τ be the voting rules as before. Now take T = V1 ∪ V2 = {a <
b, b < c, a < c, c < b, b < a, c < a}. T is consistent, since it does
not know about the properties of linear orders. If we now enforce
these, i.e., revise T by τ , a maxichoice revision would look at T⊥¬τ .
One of the sets in T⊥¬τ is, for instance, {a < c, c < b, a < b}
which together with τ would result in a strict linear order which does
not correspond to either V1 or V2. In the voting example, this is may
be a desirable outcome.
Let us return to the expectations of voting theory from the point
of view of revision theory. Voting theory expects some compromise
vote satisfying certain conditions. Belief revision tries to find some
compromise between all the Ti ⊆ T that are consistent with τ . It
will seek some compromise theory Scomp which will be acceptable
to all. This is left mostly for the selection function s presented in
Section 2.2.
Maxichoice revision operations look at all Ti′s and sets T◦τ as
Ti + τ for some Ti. In general, this Ti is not constrained at all on
containing consequences of all of the voters. Full meet revisions will
be too restrictive and comprise only the consequences of the voting
system τ (since s(T⊥¬τ ) = ∅). On the other hand, partial meet
revisions would be based on the particular subsets Ti picked by s
which again could leave the wishes of some voters out — an unfair
prospect. Therefore, an acceptable Scomp from the voting point of
view would have to rely on some meta-level principle in the case of
AGM revision functions. What can we then expect of the relationship
between Scomp and AGM? In summary,
1. If we stick with AGM, certain conditions of the voting system (τ )
can be enforced, but we cannot ensure a fair outcome unless we
also adopt some meta-level principles.
2. However, the AGM postulates may hold for a desirable Scomp
even though they do not incorporate themselves any fairness prin-
ciples from the voting point of view.
Let us now show what result we obtain when we apply a majori-
tarian model-based merging operator to the same example. As be-
fore, we want to restrict the set of all possible outcomes to the set of
linear preference orderings satisfying transitivity, totality and asym-
metry. That is, we make IC = τ . This results in the six possible
preference orderings K1—K6 illustrated in the following table. In
order to simplify the presentation, we consider only three proposi-
tions a < b, b < c and a < c. These are sufficient to represent all
possible linear orders with the three elements a, b and c (note that
(a < b) = 0 iff (b < a) = 1). We use x < y < z as a shorthand for
Cn({x < y, y < z, τ}).
a < b b < c a < c order
K1 0 0 0 c < b < a
K2 0 1 0 b < c < a
K3 0 1 1 b < a < c
K4 1 0 0 c < a < b
K5 1 0 1 a < c < b
K6 1 1 1 a < b < c
Each voter Vi of our example is satisfied exactly by one of these
models:
V1 = {(1, 1, 1)} (K6)
V2 = {(0, 1, 0)} (K2)
V3 = {(1, 0, 0)} (K4)
When we calculate the distances between each Vi and the possible
social outcomes, we obtain the following result:
d(., V1) d(., V2) d(., V3) D
d(., V )
K1 3 1 1 5
K2 2 0 2 4
K3 1 1 3 5
K4 2 2 0 4
K5 1 3 1 5
K6 0 2 2 4
There are three social orderings with minimal distance to the pro-
file V = {V1, V2, V3}. These are K2, K4 and K6, which coincide
respectively with V2 V3 and V1, respectively. The result of the belief
merging operator is a tie: ∆IC(V ) = {V1 ∨ V2 ∨ V3} .This means
that, although belief merging (with the help of the IC) avoids the
paradoxical result, this is done at the price of indecision, i.e., there
is no procedure to decide which Vi should be taken to represent the
collective preference — this effectively means no election.
4 Specifying preferences for multiple outcomes
The connection with revision theory where voters turn out to be log-
ical subtheories gives us the idea that maybe voters need not vote on
all the preferential options, but be allowed to give constraints on the
resulting compromise social vote. So instead of saying a < b and
b < c, the voter might give a conditional constraint “If you make
a < b then you must also make b < c”. We call this a conditional
preference. From the point of view of revision theory, where voters
are theories, the condition {a < b → b < c} is a perfectly legitimate
vote-theory.
Let us give an example. Consider W1,W2,W3 below:
W1 = {a < b → b < c}
W2 = {b < c → c < a}
W3 = {c < a → a < b}
So the voters do not give clear preferences but only certain con-
straints. We know that many people do that. From the logical point of
view, each voter is giving several alternative orderings, those which
satisfy their individual preference conditions. Here is a list of the op-
tions for each voter W1, W2 and W3:
W1 =a < b < c W2 = b < c < a W3 = c < a < b
b < a < c c < b < a a < c < b
c < b < a a < c < b b < a < c
b < c < a c < a < b a < b < c
In semantical terms, the set of options for each Wi will correspond
to classes of models (as seen in the previous section) — those satis-
fying his/her constraints. Let us refer to the models of W1 as follows
m11 = a < b < c
m12 = b < a < c
m13 = c < b < a
m14 = b < c < a
We can now view our problem in the following way: given a num-
ber of consistent theories, which are not consistent together, can we
find a compromise combination of them? As we have seen, we do
not want this combination to be simply one of the theories itself (this
would be a strict dictator). We will address this point of view later in
the paper.
Our problem is to consider whether there is a compromise order-
ing acceptable to all. Let each voter give value according to how
many options support his/her preference. Let us consider each pair-
wise constraint in turn.
One of the options compatible with W1 supports a < b and three
are against it (m11 is in favour and m12, m13 and m14 are against it).
That is,−2 in total. From the options compatible with W2 the overal
support is 0 and from the options compatible with W3 the overall
support is +2. The collective support for a < b is hence 0.
For a < c, we have that W1 gives 0; W2 gives −2; W3 gives +2.
The collective support is hence 0.
For b < c, W1 gives +2; W2 gives −2 and W3 votes 0. The
collective support is hence also 0.
It is easy to check that the collective support for b < a, c < a
and c < b will also be 0. Since all pairwise constraints will have the
same level of collective support, the resulting theory will contain all
of them, i.e., {a < b, b < a, a < c, c < a, b < c, c < b} which
is again not consistent with τ . Its maximal subsets consistent with τ
are:
T1∗ = {b < a, a < c}
T2∗ = {a < c, c < b}
T3∗ = {c < b, b < a}
T4∗ = {a < b, b < c}
T5∗ = {b < c, c < a}
T6∗ = {c < a, a < b}
Together with τ we get:
V1 = {b < a < c}
V2 = {a < c < b}
V3 = {c < b < a}
V4 = {a < b < c}
V5 = {b < c < a}
V6 = {c < a < b}
V1 is acceptable to W1,W3. V2 is acceptable to W2,W3. V3 is ac-
ceptable to W1,W2. V4 is acceptable to W1,W3. V5 is acceptable
to W1,W2. V6 is acceptable to W2,W3. That is, each outcome is
acceptable by two of the voters. We are getting another circular com-
promise.
It is easy to verify that belief merging would give the same result,
that is, a tie over all of the possible preference orderings Vi.
If instead of voting for each individual preference x < y, we re-
strict the voting to a complete ordering x < y < z, we need to
say how the voters are going to vote given that they have only a list
of alternatives and not a clear cut opinion. Logically, we can say let
them vote for possible total linear orderings according to whether a
total linear order satisfies their constraints. The possible orders are
the following:
L1 : a < b < c L2 : b < c < a L3 : b < a < c
L4 : a < c < b L5 : c < a < b L6 : c < b < a
and they correspond exactly to V1–V6 given before. Again there is
no option preferred by a majority of voters. Nevertheless, this result
is not discouraging. It simply reflects in the logical paradigm the un-
derlying difficulties highlighted by Condorcet and Arrow. But can
the logical approach provide us with anything new?
5 Sympathetic dictatorship
As we have just seen, allowing the representation of conditional pref-
erences by the voters does not necessarily avoid the problem with cy-
cles. In this section, we propose a more general procedure that makes
use of the logical machinery of a particular domain to conciliate pos-
sibly conflicting requirements. In the case of voting, the idea is to
let the machinery itself dictate what preferences can be consistently
combined.
In our example, we have a world of three elements {a, b, c} and
voters put forward a complete ordering on the world, for instance,
a < b < c; or give some constraints, for example, a < b → b < c.
Since from the logical point of view a voter is a theory T , we are free
to represent voters in any way allowed by the logic. When we have
several voters we get several theories T1, . . . , Tn. We are looking for
a reasonable result for the vote. Note that the voting mechanism itself
can be one of the theories, say Tv . If
S
i Ti is consistent, this means
the wishes of all the voters can be accommodated by T =
S
i Ti
(possibly within the legality of the voting process if Tv = Ti for
some i). If the union is not consistent, then we seek some compro-
mise solution. In the revision and merging approaches the problem
is the following. Given the theories T1, . . . Tn such that
S
i Ti is in-
consistent, find a compromise theory Tcomp. Revision theory would
give priority to one of the Ti’s (the input formula) and so would be-
lief merging (the integrity constraints). The only difference between
the two is in the way the original Ti’s are considered — collectively
by belief revision and individually by belief merging.
We now present an ad hoc algorithm for finding one such Tcomp.
Later in the section, we explain how the idea can be further devel-
oped. At a first approximation we can list the set of formulas which
each Ti proves as Ai1, Ai2, . . . and try to build a consistent theory by
choosing elements from each sequence. For example, we can make
one big joint sequence of these n sequences as traditionally done in
set theory:
A11, . . . , A
n
1 , A
1
2, . . . , A
n
2 , A
1
3, . . . , A
n
3 , . . .
Let B1, B2, B3, . . . be a renaming of this sequence. Let S1 =
{B1} and let Sn+1 = Sn ∪ {Bn+1} if consistent and Sn+1 = Sn
otherwise. Then Tcomp =
S
n Sn yields a maximal compromise sub-
set of
S
i Ti. The actual content of Tcomp depends on the sequencing
of Aik. Obviously, we will get more of Ti participating in Tcomp if
we sequence its elements earlier than the elements of other Tj . In
fact, this can be used to enforce the mechanism of the voting process
by having Tv listed first or to model a dictator Td by listing him/her
first instead (thus overruling Tv , if he/she so wishes). The difference
between the approach above and the one given in Section 3 is that it
allows for consequences of the other theories (voters) to be incorpo-
rated as long as they do not violate the wishes of the theories appear-
ing earlier in the sequence. It is hence sympathetic in this sense.
If we compare the above procedure with what is done in voting
theory, we see there are two differences in principle:
1. Voting compromises on a T which may not necessarily have been
chosen if we were to look at the problem from the point of view
of one or of a group of voters.
2. The choice of T is motivated not only just by sequencing the ele-
ments of Ti, which is external to the logical content of Ti, but also
by what the theories Ti actually say (i.e., in the case of Ti talking
about order then the choice must satisfy principles relating to the
ordering, etc.).
Thus, if our theories talk about electrical circuits, the construction
of Tcomp would involve circuits considerations (compromise on a
cheaper circuit?). This revision process is therefore context sensitive.
Our problem is how to develop a general theory of revision which
looks into the content of the theories involved (like voting does)
without sinking into the level of case by case analysis (voting, cir-
cuits, agricultural theories, etc.). This cannot be done without having
a general methodology. The answer can be found within the method-
ology of Labelled Deductive Systems [6, 7], in which formulae have
labels. The declarative units have the form t : A, where t is a label for
a formula A. The label can convey information about the formula as
well as whatever “specific” content sensitive conditions we want to
impose on the revision process. In general, the labels come from an
abstract algebra of labels (which can be the algebraic form of another
logic). This kind of labelled revision can be developed in the abstract
but is too general for our needs. A more specific way of labelling is
to give fuzzy values. We will consider these ideas in a future paper.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we looked at the problem of voting from a number of
different perspectives. In particular, by expressing voters preferences
and the layout of the voting system as logical theories. In trying to
conciliate these different preferences, we found that this problem has
a corresponding counterpart in different formalisms.
We started by considering the problem related to the well known
Condorcet paradox. We showed that the theory consisting of the
voters’ preferences and the voting principles is inconsistent and we
considered different ways of restoring consistency. In all cases, we
sought to ensure that the voting principles remained satisfied.
For the case of belief revision, the principles can be enforced by
revising the preferences of the individual voters by a sentence repre-
senting the layout of the system. We claimed that we can only obtain
satisfactory revisions (from the voting point of view), by imposing
fairness voting conditions at the meta-level. In addition, we showed
that full meet revisions will simply result in the voting model itself,
without keeping the preferences of any of the individual voters and
that partial meet revisions will in general fail to consider the prefer-
ences of all individuals. As a consequence, the direct application of
an AGM compliant operator is not adequate to this particular kind
of problem. However, we believe that an investigation of the appli-
cability of the principles of one of the areas to the other is indeed
promising.
We then considered a more general setting in which voters can
express conditional preferences — they state a number of possible
desirable outcomes. We found that, in general, the collective out-
come of the voting process would still encounter the same cycli-
cal problems related to the Condorcet paradox. On the other hand,
model-based belief merging circumvents the paradox by providing a
result that is, in a sense, too cautious — it simply does not make a
choice between the alternatives. To overcome these difficulties, we
proposed a conciliation process, that even though biased towards one
of the theories representing the voting process or the voters them-
selves, compromises on the wishes of the remaining ones. We called
this a sympathetic dictator.
We found from our analysis that it is possible to revise according
to the rules specifying the underlying layout of the system. In other
words, how we revise depends on the subject matter, which suggests
that we should develop postulates for context sensitive revision the-
ory.
In the specific scenario of the voting problem, the development of
a logic-based framework where one can express not only the rules
of the voting system but also how individuals formulate and change
their preferences would allow us to model the dynamics of the elec-
tion process as a whole. In particular, the elaboration, clarification
and modification of candidates’ manifestoes. This is important since
it is well known that voters rank candidates according to how well
their manifestoes match the voter’s preferences. In fact, voters may
even apply some reliability parameters in the process. As we saw in
this paper, voters can be viewed as logical theories and hence a nat-
ural extension would be to consider theories with fuzzy values. We
find that the fuzziness should be of the Dempster-Shafer type and
that there is a connection with the geometrical cross ratio of projec-
tive geometry. We can then offer voting theory a way to compile the
wishes of several voters by geometrical means taking the preferences
of each voter as a total package.
Finally, techniques from belief merging can help candidates opti-
mise their number of supporters through changes in their manifestoes
based on results obtained in opinion polls. It may well be the case that
there is an optimal manifesto that can guarantee the election of the
candidate who chooses it.
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